My research profile lies at the intersection of social epistemology, aesthetics, social philosophy and the philosophy of emotions.
I am particularly interested in the aesthetic, epistemic and social issues arising with trust, affective biases and risk-taking amidst evidential uncertainty. My work broadly analyses of the way in which affective attitudes manipulate our relationship to evidence and the formation of beliefs and analyses the implications.
My doctoral thesis 'Trust in Aesthetic Testimony', exposes the role of an evidence-resistant, affective form of trust in the formation of aesthetic beliefs. It argues that the evidence in favour of purely evaluative aesthetic beliefs is particularly weak and asks: if not on the basis of evidence, on what basis do we form these beliefs? What are the implications for our understanding of the epistemic value of deferential engagements with Aesthetic Testimony? Does a form of aesthetic skepticism arise here? Do we have an obligation to suspend judgement? What are we trying to achieve in our aesthetic engagements?
My postdoctoral project, 'Affective Voluntarism and Affective Distance', analyses the nature and role of affective responses in the formation of aesthetic judgements. I question whether normative claims might be appropriately made of such affective responses with respect to the formation of aesthetic judgements and what direction such claims would take. More information can be found here.
Recently I have also written about the puzzlingly evidence-resistant attitudes agents often have towards celebrities. I have also written on the social, affective and aesthetic implications of AI-human engagement.
Some Works in Progress:
Aesthetic Verdicts:
I reject two claims which form an emerging trend in aesthetic discourse. The first holds that deferential reliance on the aesthetic judgements of others is problematic, whilst reliance upon ourselves is unproblematic (and in fact required for the formation of legitimate aesthetic judgements). The second specifies that deferential reliance on the aesthetic judgements of others is problematic for reasons which pertain to aesthetic value and not epistemic value. I argue that, contrary to the increasingly popular opinion, deferential reliance on others (second-hand reliance) for verdictive aesthetic judgements is epistemically problematic in important overlooked ways, whilst the concerns pertaining to aesthetic value are overstated. Moreover, the epistemic problems facing second-hand sources in this context are shared by reliance upon first-hand sources (first-hand reliance).
Aesthetic Skepticism and Epistemic Permissivism:
This paper explicates a particular kind of aesthetic skepticism and argues that standard response to it fail. It will consider whether epistemic permissivism is nevertheless reasonable in this context and whether there are any further implications for issues aesthetic normativity.
(Contact me if you would like to take a look at a draft of these papers)
Selected Publications:
2025. 'Emotions towards AI and the Echoes of a Paradox' in Oxford Intersections: AI in Society. Edited by Henry Shevlin. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
2024. 'Celebrity and Epistemic Influence: Evidence resistance and Epistemic recklessness', in Philosophy of Fame. Edited by Alfred Archer, Catherine Robb and Matthew Dennis. London: Bloomsbury.
2024. 'Aesthetic Testimony', in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Co-authored with Jon Robson.
2022. 'Appreciation is Overrated', in Perspectives on Taste, edited by Jeremy Wyatt, Dan Zeman and Julia Zakkou. Co-authored with Jon Robson.
2021. 'Trust, Testimony and Reasons for Belief', in Epistemic Duties. Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain. Routledge. Co-authored with Andrew Reisner.
Book Reviews:
2024. 'Aesthetic Testimony: An Optimistic Approach. Jon Robson OUP. 2022. pp. 176. £65.00 (hbk)' The British Journal of Aesthetics, ayad043.