My research interests primarily lie within aesthetics, normativity, social epistemology and the philosophy of emotions.
My project is titled 'Affective Voluntarism and Affective Distance', it analyses the nature and role of certain affective responses in the formation of aesthetic judgements. I question whether normative claims might be appropriately made of such affective responses with respect to the formation of aesthetic judgements and what direction such claims would take. More information can be found here.
The project draws from my PhD, 'Trust in Aesthetic Testimony'. My research on trust in aesthetic testimony centres on the way in which affective attitudes manipulate our relationship to evidence and the formation of beliefs. My work analyses the epistemic, practical and aesthetic implications of evidence-resistant trust in the testimony of purported epistemic authorities - both groups and individuals.
I have also recently written on affective attitudes towards AI and I am interested in the normative puzzles surrounding AI-human engagement.
Works in Progress:
Aesthetic Verdicts:
I reject two claims which form an emerging trend in aesthetic discourse. The first holds that deferential reliance on the aesthetic judgements of others is problematic, whilst reliance upon ourselves is unproblematic (and in fact required for the formation of legitimate aesthetic judgements). The second specifies that deferential reliance on the aesthetic judgements of others is problematic for reasons which pertain to aesthetic value and not epistemic value. I argue that, contrary to the increasingly popular opinion, deferential reliance on others (second-hand reliance) for verdictive aesthetic judgements is epistemically problematic in important overlooked ways, whilst the concerns pertaining to aesthetic value are overstated. Moreover, the epistemic problems facing second-hand sources in this context are shared by reliance upon first-hand sources (first-hand reliance).
Aesthetic Skepticism and Epistemic Permissivism:
This paper explicates a particular kind of aesthetic skepticism and argues that standard response to it fail. It will consider whether epistemic permissivism is nevertheless reasonable in this context and whether there are any further implications for issues aesthetic normativity.
(Contact me if you would like to take a look at a draft of these papers)
Selected Publications:
2025. 'Emotions towards AI and the Echoes of a Paradox' in Oxford Intersections: AI in Society. Edited by Henry Shevlin. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
2024. 'Celebrity and Epistemic Influence: Evidence resistance and Epistemic recklessness', in Philosophy of Fame. Edited by Alfred Archer, Catherine Robb and Matthew Dennis. London: Bloomsbury.
2024. 'Aesthetic Testimony', in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Co-authored with Jon Robson.
2022. 'Appreciation is Overrated', in Perspectives on Taste, edited by Jeremy Wyatt, Dan Zeman and Julia Zakkou. Co-authored with Jon Robson.
2021. 'Trust, Testimony and Reasons for Belief', in Epistemic Duties. Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain. Routledge. Co-authored with Andrew Reisner.
Book Reviews:
2024. 'Aesthetic Testimony: An Optimistic Approach. Jon Robson OUP. 2022. pp. 176. £65.00 (hbk)' The British Journal of Aesthetics, ayad043.